moreandmoredangerous,andmoreandmoretransmissible?Dotheresearchbenefitsoutweightherisks?”TheWHO’simminentbiosafetyguide-lineswilltrytoaddresssuchproliferationconcerns,saysoneWHOofficial.Beyondmakingrecommendationsaboutbiologi-calcontainmentlevelsandotherphysicalprecautions,theWHOwillalsosuggestthatlabsshouldmeetthehigheststand-ardsofsafety,attaininginternationalstandardsforstafftrainingandmanagingbiologicalrisks.Theidea,saystheWHOofficial,istosetahighbarforentryintothistypeofwork.Fourleadingpublic-healthscientistsalsocalledforcautioninanarticle6publishedinthesameissueofScienceasFouchier’spaper.Anypredictionsofflu’sbehaviourbasedonitscomplexgeneticsandhostinteractionsare“highlyspeculative”,theywrite,whichraisesquestionsaboutthepotentialbenefitofmutant-virusworktoflusurveillance.Moreover,currentsystemsofgeneticsurveillanceoffluvirusesaretoopatchy,andyearscanpassbeforesamplesaresequenced7.Contrastingtheuncertainbenefitswithan“exceptionallevelofriskshouldmotivateexceptionalcautionbyscientists,funders,andregulatorsworld-wide”,theauthorswrite6.ButFouchiersaysthatthemutantfluvirusesthatheandKawaokahaveworkedonraisefewnewbiosafetyissues.“Foroveracentury,theinfectious-diseasecommu-nityhaspublishedworkondangerouspathogenswhilerelyingonnationalgov-ernments,institutionalbiosafetyofficesandtheresponsibilityofscientiststoensurethattheworkisdoneunderappro-priateconditions,”Fouchieradds.“Verylittlehasgonewrongsofar,sowhywouldthatbedifferentnow?”ThedebateoverrisksandbenefitsislikelytocometoaheadatameetingthattheWHOwillconveneearlynextyeartodiscussthewiderimplicationsofhigh-riskbiologicalresearchandhowresearchers,institutionsandgovernmentsmightbestassessandmanagerisk.“Themeetingwillnotberestrictedtofluresearchers,orvirologistsorresearchersofanysort,”saystheWHOofficial.“Theywillcertainlyberepresented,butsotoowillothergroupswhichhaveverylegitimateinterestsandperspect